Taiwan Launches National AI Strategy Committee: Risk Assessment by July, Industry Regulations by 2028, Asia-Pacific Governance Race Quietly Accelerates

While global attention focuses on the EU's AI Act, the US executive order debates, and China's generative AI management measures, Taiwan on the other side of the Asia-Pacific is advancing its own AI governance efforts in a relatively low-key but tightly paced manner. According to public information, on May 23, Taiwan established the National AI Strategy Committee chaired by the Premier, initiating the implementation of the AI Basic Law passed in December 2024. This framework requires agencies to complete risk assessments by July and formulate industry-level AI regulations by January 2028.

The Governance Logic Behind a Timeline

From the disclosed timeline, Taiwan's deployment has two noteworthy details: first, the committee is chaired by the Premier, elevating AI governance to the highest level of cross-ministerial coordination rather than delegating it to a single competent authority; second, there is a nearly three-year buffer between the "risk assessment by July" and "industry regulations by January 2028," a design rarely seen in international AI governance practices.

Most regions follow either a path of legislation first and enforcement later (e.g., the EU) or rely on industry self-regulation and ex-post accountability (e.g., some US states). Taiwan's approach is closer to a progressive model of "assess first, regulate later"—using a half-year period for agencies to inventory their AI applications and risk exposure, then spending nearly three years to refine rules at the industry level.

Why a "Whole-of-Government" Framework?

Regional AI governance observers have noted that Taiwan's latest initiative is not merely a regulation targeting generative AI or specific high-risk scenarios, but a "whole-of-government" governance framework. This orientation involves at least three layers of considerations worth examining.

The first layer is the uniqueness of the industrial structure. Taiwan plays a critical role in the global semiconductor supply chain, where AI computing infrastructure is tightly coupled with wafer manufacturing. Any AI governance framework that fails to align with the upstream and downstream segments of the supply chain risks becoming ineffective at the implementation level. The Premier's chairmanship itself is a response to the difficulty of cross-ministerial and cross-industry coordination.

The second layer is the pressure to align with international rules. The EU AI Act has entered its enforcement phase, while AI governance frameworks in the US, UK, Japan, Singapore, and elsewhere are rapidly evolving. For Taiwan's highly export-oriented economy, if AI rules diverge from those of major trading partners, it would directly impact the competitiveness of product and service exports. The two-layer structure of a basic law plus industry-specific rules theoretically leaves room for future alignment with international frameworks.

The third layer is the urgency of the time window. The penetration of generative AI into industries is far faster than that of traditional technologies; if regulation does not intervene early, the cost of catching up later will rise exponentially. By launching the committee and issuing a risk assessment deadline within half a year of the AI Basic Law's passage, Taiwan demonstrates awareness of this window.

An Anomalous Signal: Tension Between the Buffer Period and Enforcement Capability

However, this framework also has clear internal tensions. The most prominent is that the window for drafting industry regulations, from 2025 to early 2028, spans nearly three years, while AI technology and business model iteration cycles are often measured in quarters. In other words, by the time industry regulations take effect in 2028, many of the technological forms discussed today may have been replaced by new paradigms.

Is this buffer period prudent or lagging? The answer is hard to determine. An optimistic reading is that Taiwan aims to avoid the pitfall of "legislation becoming obsolete upon enactment," leaving room to observe international best practices. A pessimistic reading is that three years could allow gray areas lacking clear rules to accumulate substantial vested interests, increasing political resistance to future legislation.

Another uncertainty lies in the specific standards for "risk assessment." Agencies must complete their assessments by July, but whether the assessment methodology, risk classification standards, and disclosure requirements are uniform remains unclear from publicly available information. If each department acts independently, the so-called "whole-of-government" framework may be merely nominal.

Significance for the Asia-Pacific Governance Landscape

From a broader regional perspective, the symbolic significance of Taiwan's move may outweigh its immediate impact. Japan is advancing the refinement of its AI Promotion Act, South Korea's AI Basic Law has been passed, and Singapore continues to export soft rules through its "Model AI Governance Framework." Taiwan's entry into this arena means that the Asia-Pacific region is forming a multi-centric governance pattern, rather than being dominated by a single legislative paradigm.

For Chinese-speaking readers, Taiwan's practice offers a case study: an economy heavily reliant on the tech industry and facing international rule pressure designs its institutions between "encouraging innovation" and "managing risks." Its experiences and lessons offer reference value for policy discussions in other Asia-Pacific regions.

Independent Assessment

Taiwan's launch of the National AI Strategy Committee is ambitious in institutional design, but the key to success lies not in the text but in execution. The three-year buffer period for industry regulations is both an advantage and a risk—the advantage lies in the ability to absorb international experience, while the risk is that regulatory timing may be missed. What truly warrants long-term tracking is not the basic law itself, but how the risk assessments submitted by agencies in July will be integrated and translated into concrete rules. If this step becomes a mere formality, even the grandest framework will remain on paper; if it generates a genuine cross-ministerial coordination mechanism, Taiwan may contribute a valuable model to Asia-Pacific AI governance.